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DRY-HOLE AGREEMENTS AND DEBT
LIMITATION PROVISIONS: THE LESSONS
OF WPPSS
I. INTRODUCTION
A fundamental duty of any municipality is to provide its citizens
with electricity.' To ensure an adequate future supply of power, the
municipality must base its plans on estimates of future electrical needs.
In the state of Washington, miscalculations of these estimates led to an
unprecedented bond default when cost overruns halted the completion
of two nuclear power plants.2 In the wake of litigation resulting from
this default, municipalities that contracted with the regional power
supply system sought to escape from their payment obligations.'
Courts examining the contracts between the power supply system
and the municipalities focus on two issues. First, because contracts
with the power supply system obligated municipalities to pay regard-
less of whether the power plants produced any electricity, some cities
asserted a lack of statutory authority to enter into the contracts. The
Washington Supreme Court held that local governments lacked the
statutory authority to purchase electricity and to construct and operate
generating facilities.4 Basing this conclusion on a narrow interpreta-
1. This duty arises from specific statutory authority. See infra notes 49-52. Munici-
pal officials also feel a moral duty to provide their citizens with power. See Olsen, infra
note 9, at 20.
2. Several sources provide a general background. See Hittle, Pacific Northwest
Power Generation, Multi-Purpose Use of the Columbia River, and Regional Energy Leg-
islation: An Overview, 10 ENVTL. L. 235 (1980); Foote, Larsen and Maddow, Bonneville
Power Administration: Northwest Power Broker, 6 ENVTL. L. 831 (1976); Natural Re-
sources Defense Council v. Hodel, 435 F. Supp. 590 (1977).
3. A general description of this litigation is found in Olsen, infra note 9.
4. Chemical Bank v. Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys., 99 Wash. 2d 772, 666
Washington University Open Scholarship
326 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 34:325
tion of the statutes, the court ignored the proprietary character of the
municipalities' acts.' Second, local governments also claimed that
their unconditional obligation to pay the power system violated state
debt limitation provisions. Disagreeing with the Idaho Supreme
Court,6 the Oregon Supreme Court7 concluded that' the amounts paid
by the municipalities for the supply of power failed to violate statutory
debt limitation provisions.'
This Note examines the positions of the Washington, Oregon, and
Idaho courts and argues that the burden of the bond default should
rest on the municipalities instead of the bondholders. Part II deline-
ates the background of this litigation. Part III examines the correct
standard of statutory interpretation for purchases of electricity. Part
IV analyzes debt limitation provisions to determine whether the mu-
nicipalities created debt. Part V urges the adoption of liberal statutory
interpretation and the application of a broad special fund.
II. THE SETTING
In 1957, sixteen public utility districts in the state of Washington
formed a joint operating agency (JOA) to construct and operate electri-
cal generating facilities and to sell the electricity produced.9 Now
called the Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS), this
P.2d 329 (1983), is the principal case in the morass of litigation. It is an action by the
bondholder trustee to hold the municipalities to their contracts.
5. According to a noted commentator, statutory authority must be interpreted in
accord with the type of act the municipality is performing. See infra notes 89-90. A
municipality acts either in a private capacity or in a governmental capacity.
6. Asson v. City of Burley, 105 Idaho 432, 670 P.2d 839 (1983).
7. DeFazio v. Washington Public Power Supply Sys., 296 Or. 550, 679 P.2d 1316
(1984).
8. A debt limitation provision prevents a municipality from entering into projects
that create debt without the assint of its voters. Debt limitation provisions and the
exemptions from them are described in detail below. See infra notes 111-118 and ac-
companying text.
9. Olsen, The Washington Public Power Supply System: The Story So Far, 109 Pun.
UTIL. FORT. 15, 17 (June 10, 1982).
Many states have joint operating agency statutes. These statutes authorize municipal
entities to create a joint operating agency that is an agent or instrumentality of the
municipalities. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.1332 (West Supp. 1983); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 43.52.360 (1983). The joint operating agency is managed by a board made up of
representatives of the municipal entities. Comment, Chemical Bank v. Washington
Pub. Power Supply Sys.: The Questionable Use of the Ultra Vires Doctrine to Invalidate
Governmental Take-or-Pay Obligations, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 1094, 1105 (1984).
An advantage of the JOA is that it allows the municipal entities to share the capital
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JOA includes nineteen public utility districts and four cities.1" WPPSS
has authority to acquire, build, operate, and own electrical generating
facilities." As a JOA, WPPSS also has authority to issue revenue
bonds payable from the revenues of the various utilities operated by
it. 1
The planners of WPPSS felt a moral duty to provide electricity re-
gardless of any foreseeable catastrophe to the electrical system.1 3 This
self-imposed duty led the planners of WPPSS to provide for a surplus
of electricity.14 Unfortunately, the planners relied on grossly miscalcu-
lated future load growth estimates. 5 Compounded by cost escalation
and mismanagement, these miscalculations intimated the demise of
WPPSS.'
6
costs and financial risks of electric generation projects. Worenklein, Project Financing
of Joint Ventures, 108 PuB. UTIL. FoRT. 39, 40-41 (Dec. 3, 1981).
The municipal entities that create the JOA are not directly obligated to pay debts
incurred by the JOA. Id. Rather, investors who purchase the bonds issued by the JOA
"must base their credit evaluations on the ability of the project as a whole to generate
enough cash revenues to service the debt of the project company and to meet its other
expenses." Id at 40. The JOA usually lacks security for the bonds. To help market the
bonds, the municipal entities provide credit support to secure the debt of the JOA. Id
Normally, the municipal entities provide capital to construct the project and agree to
pay for the energy provided by the project in an amount sufficient to service the project
debt. Id.
10. Chemical Bank v. Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys., 99 Wash. 2d 772, 777,
666 P.2d 329, 331 (1983). The cities are Ellensburg, Richland, Seattle and Tacoma. Id
11. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.52.300 (1985).
12. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.52.3411 (1985). In general, revenue bonds are
"long term municipal debt which is secured only by contractual obligation to repay the
bonds from a designated source of revenue. Rankin, Osburn and Rogers, Municipal
Bonds and Property Tax Limitations, 9 ENVTL. L. 453, 466 (1979). If there is a default
on the revenue bonds, the issuer is not obligated to make payments from its general
fund. Id at 467. A revenue bond is more risky than a general obligation bond. Id As
a result, borrowing with revenue bonds is costlier than borrowing with general obliga-
tion bonds. Id. Here, WPPSS issued the revenue bonds to pay for WNP 4 and 5. The
Participants agreed to pay WPPSS sufficient funds to cover the cost of the bonds plus
interest.
13. Olsen, supra note 9, at 21.
14. Id The planners assumed that forecast predictions that were too low could
have significant social and economic consequences, such as reduced capital investment,
fewer jobs, and lower living standards. Id at 20.
15. Id The planners believed that the region's future electrical loads would con-
tinue in accord with the past trend of five to seven percent annual increases. Id In
actuality, the average annual load increases about half of the estimates. Id
16. Id at 16. Except for the Tennessee Valley Authority, WPPSS is the largest
public nuclear power plant construction program in the country. Id at 15-16. When
1988]
Washington University Open Scholarship
328 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 34:325
In 1974, concern over increasing electrical loads prompted WPPSS
to authorize the construction of two nuclear power plants (WNP 4 and
5).17 WNP 4 and 5 were designed to supplement the power from
WPPSS' three extant nuclear power facilities (WNP 1, 2 and 3).18 To
finance these two additional plants, WPPSS contracted with eighty-
eight municipal entities in six states (Participants).1 9 To represent
these contracts, each Participant signed an identical "Participant's
Agreement" (Agreement).20
The federal government financed WNP 1, 2, and 3, but not WNP 4
and 5.21 Rather, the Participants directly financed22 WNP 4 and 5
through their own borrowing capabilities.23 The Agreement provides
that the Participants may pay WPPSS only from the revenues derived
by the individual Participant from sale of its share of the electricity
from WNP 4 and 5.24 To ensure that the payments are made only
WPPSS began planning construction, the five nuclear plants were projected to cost $4.5
billion. Id. at 16. At least 20 billion additional dollars will be needed to effect this plan
today. Id. This cost escalation was due to increases in inflation, interest rates, and
construction delays. Id. at 19.
17. Id. at 20.
18. Chemical Bank, 99 Wash. 2d at 777, 666 P.2d at 331.
19. Id. at 778, 666 P.2d at 332. In addition to WPPSS itself and Pacific Power &
Light Company, there are eighty-eight Washington cities, nineteen Washington public
utility districts, one Washington irrigation district, seven Oregon cities, four Oregon
peoples utility districts, five Idaho cities, and forty-three rural electric cooperatives in
Washington, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, and Wyoming. Id.
20. I d Washington state law required these Participants' agreements on a plant
before the JOA could issue revenue bonds. Olsen, supra note 9, at 20.
21. Olsen, supra note 9, at 20. The Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), a fed-
eral agency, aided the financing of WNP 1, 2, and through complex agreements that
allocated the risk of noncompletion to the federal agency. Chemical Bank, 99 Wash. 2d
at 777, 666 P.2d at 332. See City of Springfield v. Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys.,
564 F. Supp. 90, 95 (D. Or. 1983) ("net billing" agreements resulted in antidirect guar-
anty by federal agency). Moreover, changes in Internal Revenue Service regulations
subsequent to the construction of WNP 1, 2, and 3 prevented WPPSS from financing
facilities with tax-exempt bonds if a federal agency purchased more than twenty-five
percent of the power. Olsen, supra note 9, at 20.
22. Due to the lack of federal backing, the bonds issued by WPPSS for WNP 4 and
5 entailed greater risks than those issued for WNP 1, 2 and 3. To attract investors,
these bonds carried a higher interest rate, further adding to cost overruns. Olsen, supra
note 9, at 20.
23. The Participants issued revenue bonds to finance WNP 4 and 5. The bond reso-
lution requires the Participants to make payments to WPPSS for electricity and capabil-
ity, which are adequate to provide for payment of the revenue bonds. Chemical Bank,
99 Wash. 2d at 776, 666 P.2d at 332.
24. DeFazio v. Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys., 296 Or. 550, 558, 679 P.2d
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from this special fund,25 the Agreement requires that each Participant
maintain its rates high enough to cover its payments to WPPSS.
26
Under the Agreement, each Participant must pay its proportionate
share of the annual budget of WPPSS for a reciprocal share of the pro-
ject's capability. 7 In other words, the Participants must pay even if no
electricity is produced.28 Such an agreement is commonly called a dry-
1316, 1323 (1984). This provision requires that the Participants make payments to
WPPSS only from a "special fund" established by each municipality. This obviates the
need to pledge tax and other general revenue of the municipality. See generally, Heil
Another Day Older and Deeper in Debt: Debt Limitation, the Broad Special Fund Doc-
trine, and WPPSS 4 and 5, 7 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 81 (1983). The Participants'
Agreement provides:
No Participant ... shall be required to make any payments to Supply System under
this Agreement except from the revenues derived by such Participant from the
ownership and operation of its electric utility properties.
DeFazio, 296 Or. at 558, 679 P.2d at 1323.
25. "Special Fund" is defined infra notes 111-118 and accompanying text.
26. The Agreement provides:
[Each] Participant covenants and agrees that it will establish, maintain and collect
rates or charges for power and energy and other services, facilities and commodi-
ties sold, furnished or supplied by it through any of its electric utility properties
which shall be adequate to provide revenues sufficient to enable the participant to
make the payments to be made by it to Supply System under this Agreement and to
pay all other charges and obligations payable from or constituting a charge or lien
upon such revenues.
DeFazio, 296 Or. at 558, 679 P.2d at 1323.
27. Chemical Bank, 99 Wash. 2d at 777-78, 666 P.2d at 332. The Participants'
Agreement defined "[p]roject [c]apability" as:
the amounts of electric power and energy, if any, which the Projects are capable of
generating at any particular time (including times when either or both of the Plants
are not operable or operating or the operation thereof is suspended, interrupted,
interfered with, reduced or curtailed, in each case in whole or in part for any rea-
son whatsoever) less Project station use and losses.
Id.
It must be emphasized that the Agreement provides for the purchase of project capa-
bility rather than for the purchase of electricity. See infra note 28.
28. Chemical Bank, 99 Wash. 2d at 778, 666 P.2d at 332. The Agreement provided:
The Participant shall make the payments to be made to Supply System under this
Agreement whether or not any of the Projects are completed, operable or operating
and notwithstanding the suspension, interruption, interference, reduction or cur-
tailment of the output of either Project for any reason whatsoever in whole or in
part. Such payments shall not be subject to any reduction, whether by offset or
otherwise, and shall not be conditioned upon the performance or nonperformance
by Supply System or any other Participant or entity under this or any other agree-
ment or instrument, the remedy for any nonperforming being limited to manda-
mus, specific performance or other legal or equitable remedy.
Id This provision makes the Participants' payments the unconditional obligation of the
Participants.
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hole agreement because the municipality assumes the risk that the pro-
ject may fail.29 Despite this obvious risk, dry-hole provisions remain a
popular provision in financing agreements of utility projects.30 The ob-
ligations of the WPPSS contracts seem particularly onerous because
WNP 4 and 5 are less than twenty-five percent complete and have yet
to produce any electricity.31 Massive cost overruns and delays man-
aged to consume the entire bond issue.32 Once interest and carrying
charges are computed, the Agreements held the Participants liable for
seven billion dollars,33 even though the Participants never received any
electricity.34
Faced with a near insurmountable debt, the individual Participants
sought to escape their contractual obligations with WPPSS.35 The va-
lidity of such agreements turned on two issues. First, courts deter-
mined whether the Participants had statutory authority to enter into
the dry-hole agreements. 36 Second, courts determined whether the is-
suance of the bonds violated state debt limitation provisions.37
29. This term arises because those entering such an agreement must pay even if the
project turns out to be a dry hole, producing nothing. Such clauses are also called "hell-
or-high water" provisions. See Worenklein, supra note 9, at 40. By obligating them-
selves to pay under all circumstances, the municipal entities unconditionally guaranteed
the WPPSS bonds. Chemical Bank, 99 Wash. 2d at 784, 666 P.2d at 335. These dry-
hole provisions place the credit of all eighty-eight participants behind the bonds, thus
making the arrangement more attractive to the investors. The municipalities, rather
than the investors, bear the risk of non-completion.
30. See infra note 48.
31. Chemical Bank, 99 Wash. 2d at 776, 666 P.2d at 331. On January 22, 1982,
WPPSS terminated construction of both plants. Id. At that time, WNP 4 was 24 per-
cent completed and WNP5 was 16 percent completed. But see Olsen, supra note 9, at
25 (the possibility still exists that WNP 4 and 5 will be built by other utilities or
investors).
32. See Heil, supra note 24, at 101.
33. Id See also Chemical Bank, 99 Wash. 2d at 776, 666 P.2d at 331.
34. This clearly illustrates one of the disadvantages of dry-hole agreements.
35. See Chemical Bank, 99 Wash. 2d 776, 666 P.2d 329 (1983); DeFazio, 296 Or.
350, 679 P.2d 1316 (1984); Asson v. City of Burley, 105 Idaho 839, 670 P.2d 839
(1983).
36. See generally Chemical Bank, 99 Wash. 2d 772, 666 P.2d 329.
37. See generally DeFazio, 296 Or. 550, 679 P.2d 1316; Asson, 105 Idaho 432, 443,
670 P.2d 839, 851 (Bakes, J., dissenting).
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III. STATUTORY AUTHORITY
A. Does the purchase of project capability qualify
as a purchase of electricity?
In Chemical Bank v. Washington Public Power Supply System,38 the
Washington Supreme Court considered whether the WPPSS Partici-
pants had the statutory authority to enter into agreements containing
dry-hole provisions.39 The court examined whether the statutory au-
thority to purchase electricity' extends to the purchase of project ca-
pability. Without citing supporting authority, the Chemical Bank
court held that such an agreement fails to qualify as a purchase of
electricity.4"
Disagreeing with the majority's narrow view of the statute,42 the dis-
senting justice43 urged a liberal interpretation' that would further the
statutory purpose of furnishing power45 and would include the
purchase of project capability. The Participants formed the Agreement
under circumstances that foreshadowed future energy shortfalls; there-
fore, at the time, the purchase of a future source of power was advisa-
ble.' The existence of statutory authority for the purchase of project
38. 99 Wash. 2d 772, 666 P.2d 329 (1983).
39. In Chemical Bank, Chemical Bank, the bond trustee, brought a declaratory
judgment action against WPPSS and the Participants. Id at 776, 666 P.2d at 331.
Chemical Bank sought a determination that the Participants "owe to WPPSS sufficient
funds to pay the bonds, with interest." Id WPPSS agrees with Chemical Bank as to
the rights of the parties. Id The Participants established defenses to the payment obli-
gations. Id. The basic issue for the court in Chemical Bank was whether the Agree-
ment was a contract within the statutory authority of the Participants located in the
state of Washington. Id at 781, 666 P.2d at 334.
40. Id. The Washington statute provides: "A district may purchase, within or
without its limits, electric current for sale and distribution within or without its limits
.. " WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 54.16.040 (1985).
41. 99 Wash. 2d at 784, 666 P.2d at 335.
42. See infra note 40.
43. Utter, J., dissenting. Chemical Bank, 99 Wash. 2d at 810, 666 P.2d at 348.
44. 99 Wash. 2d at 810, 666 P.2d at 349.
45. Id. See State ex rel. PUD 1 v. Wylie, 28 Wash. 2d 113, 182 P.2d 706 (1947).
The court in Frank v. City of Cody, 572 P.2d 1106, 1115 (Wyo. 1977) also urges a
liberal view of statutes. The court in Frank states, "It would be an impossible and
impracticable demand for us to insist on the legislature providing every little detail on
how to go about carrying out an authority bestowed." Id
46. Chemical Bank, 99 Wash. 2d at 812, 666 P.2d at 349. Although the Agreement
requires payment for a potential dry-hole, this is true of other standard contracts as well
(i.e., option contracts). I& at 811, 666 P.2d at 349. A dry-hole contract is "highly
advisable" in a market with unpredictable power demands such as that of the Pacific
1988]
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capability is further supported by the Washington state legislature's
failure to react to the contracts4 7 and the sustaining of dry-hole agree-
ments by other courts.48
B. Did the Participants possess authority to construct, operate, and
acquire WNP 4 and 5?
A second question is whether the Participants possessed the statu-
tory authority to construct, acquire, and operate the generating facili-
ties controlled by WPPSS.49 The statutes of Washington,50 Idaho,
5
'
and Oregon52 specifically grant this authority. Although such a grant
Northwest. Id. See also Olsen, supra note 9, at 20. Today, fifteen years after the forma-
tion of the Agreement, the days of the Arab oil embargo and what many leaders
thought was the beginning of a national energy crisis are but distant memories. Justice
Utter concludes that in light of this history, the overbuilding created by these contracts
was justified, and a future reduction in demand was unforeseeable. 99 Wash. 2d at 812,
666 P.2d at 350.
Yet this view is easily contrasted with the facts known by those in charge of WPPSS
in 1974. By the 1970's, it was clear that WPPSS suffered from massive cost overruns.
In 1974 alone, the estimated completion costs for WNP 1, 2, and 3 increased by almost
one billion dollars. Olsen, supra note 9, at 21. In fact, in 1974, the managing director of
WPPSS warned of delays that will "increase plant costs for an industry already encoun-
tering high financial charges and escalating labor and equipment costs." Id. Although
the predictions of future shortages did create a perceived need for WNP 4 and 5, cost
overruns may have been avoidable.
47. 99 Wash. 2d at 812-13, 666 P.2d at 350. Justice Utter stated, "Legislative ac-
quiescence in such an entity's interpretation of the statutes.., is a significant indication
of legislative intent." Id at 813, 666 P.2d at 350. Cf. Washington Educ. Ass'n v.
Smith, 96 Wash. 2d 601, 606, 638 P.2d 77, 80 (1981) (legislature's acquiescence to At-
torney General's interpretation indicates legislature's intent).
48. See Board of Commr's v. All Taxpayers, 360 So. 2d 863, 867 (La. 1978); State
ex rel. Mitchell v. Sikeston, 555 S.W.2d 281 (Mo. 1977); Johnson v. Piedmont Mun.
Power Agency, 277 S.C. 345, 287 S.E.2d 476 (1982).
49. 99 Wash. 2d at 785, 666 P.2d at 335.
50. The Washington statute provides:
A city or town may also construct, condemn and purchase, purchase, and acquire,
add to, alter, maintain and operate works, plants, facilities for the purpose of fur-
nishing the city or town and its inhabitants, and any other persons, with gas,
electricity...
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 35.92.05 (1985).
51. The Idaho statute provides:
Cities shall have authority: to acquire, own, maintain and operate electric power
plants, purchase electric power, and provide for distribution to the residents of the
city, and to sell excess power..
IDAHO CODE § 50-325 (1976).
52. The Oregon statute provides:
In addition to the powers otherwise conferred on cities of this state, such a city
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of power seems to provide clear statutory support for the Participants'
Agreements with WPPSS to build WNP 4 and 5, courts often add ad-
ditional requirements.
1. The requirement of an ownership interest
According to the court in Chemical Bank, to exercise this clear stat-
utory authority, the Participants must retain either an ownership inter-
est or the equivalent of an ownership interest in the project.53 The
court in Chemical Bank stated that only WPPSS and the Pacific Power
& Light Company retained an ownership interest in WNP 4 and 5,54
concluding that the Participants lack an ownership interest because
they contracted only to purchase a share of project capability. 55
The court in Chemical Bank asserted that the states which recognize
the validity of dry-hole agreements base that recognition on explicit
statutory authority which the court asserted is lacking here.5 6 The
owning and operating an electric light and power system may plan, finance, con-
struct, acquire, operate, own and maintain an undivided interest in common facili-
ties within or without the state jointly with one or more other cities, with one or
more districts, with one or more electric cooperatives or with one or more privately
owned electric utility companies subject to regulation by the Public Utility Com-
missioner of Oregon or the equivalent officer or commission of California, Idaho,
Montana, Nevada or Washington, or with any combination of such cities, districts,
electric cooperatives or companies in this or such other states, and may make such
plans and enter into such contracts and agreements as are necessary or appropriate
for such joint planning, financing, construction, acquisition, operation, ownership
or maintenance.
OR. REv. STAT. § 225.470 (1980).
53. 99 Wash. 2d at 785, 666 P.2d at 336. The court states that in construing the
statute, they have "never found authority for a project in which the participants did not
have an ownership interest." It
54. Id. The court states that WNP 4 is "owned" completely by WPPSS and WNP
5 is "owned" by WPPSS (90%) and the Pacific Power and Light Company (10%). Id
at 777, 666 P.2d at 331-32.
55. Id. at 785, 666 P.2d at 336.
56. Id Specifically, the court cites a South Carolina statute:
Any municipality which is a member of the joint agency may contract to buy from
the joint agency power and energy required for its present or future requirements,
including the capacity and output of one or more specified projects. As the crea-
tion of a joint agency is an alternative method whereby a municipality may obtain
the benefits and assume the responsibilities of ownership in a project, any such
contract may provide that the municipality so contracting shall be obligated to
make the payments required by the contract whether or not a project is completed,
operable or operating...
S.C. CODE ANN. § 6-23-110 (La. Co-op Supp. 1982). 99 Wash. 2d at 786, 666 P.2d at
336-37. The majority attempts to dismiss this statute on the grounds that it is more
19881
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court seems to equate "ownership" solely with "purchase of electric-
ity." Although WPPSS and Pacific Power & Light financially own the
property, the Participants "own" the project capability of WNP 4 and
5.7 Thus, although the court in Chemical Bank claims that the Par-
ticipants fail to "own" WNP 4 and 5, it places on the Participants the
sole responsibility for the seven billion dollar cost of the project.
2. The "equivalence of an ownership interest" requirement
The court in Chemical Bank next stated that the statute requires the
"equivalen[ce] of an ownership interest." 8 Under this requirement,
the Participants lack statutory authority to construct, acquire, and op-
erate utilities59 unless they retain an active role in the management of
the projects.' Interpreting the Agreement as precluding meaningful
deliberation by the Participants regarding the management of
WPPSS,61 the court found the Participants Committee to be little more
than a rubber stamp.62
Contrary to the court's characterization, the Participants' Commit-
tee had an important role in the management of WPPSS. The Agree-
ment established this committee specifically to approve or disapprove
specific than the Washington statute. 99 Wash. 2d at 786-87, 666 P.2d at 336-37. The
South Carolina statute merely mentions dry-hole agreements. The action of one state's
legislature in explicitly mentioning dry-hole agreements hardly creates a mandate for
finding such authority before dry-hole agreements will be upheld. The decisions of
other states in upholding dry-hole agreements in the absence of explicit statutory au-
thority supports this conclusion. See supra note 48. Because such agreements are wide-
spread, it is hard to believe that Washington had never heard of them when its
legislation was drafted.
57. As the Participants must unconditionally purchase the project capability, they
clearly "own" the project capability. The Participants possess a greater ownership in-
terest in WNP 4 and 5 from the purchase of project capability than if they agreed to
purchase electricity. If the latter situation were the case, then upon failure of WPPSS
the participants would be obligated to pay nothing.
58. 99 Wash. 2d at 787, 666 P.2d at 337. The issue becomes whether the partici-
pants "retained sufficient control over the project to constitute the equivalen[ce] of an
ownership interest." Id.
59. See supra notes 50-52.
60. 99 Wash. 2d at 787, 666 P.2d at 337. See Frank v. City of Cody, 572 P.2d 1106,
1111 (Wyo. 1977) (court upholds an agreement to form a municipal power agency on
the ground that the municipality retained its power of "judgment, discretion and
management").
61. 99 Wash. 2d at 787, 666 P.2d at 337.
62. Id.
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of the system's major management decisions.63 Although such ap-
proval or disapproval had to occur within fifteen days,' the Commit-
tee was quite capable of performing its duty. The Committee was
accustomed to making quick decisions on construction budgets and
large contracts.6 5
Further, the court's claim in Chemical Bank that Participants lacked
control is not entirely accurate. 66 Actually, the Participants failed to
exercise control. The Participants Committee was clearly a means by
which the Participants could exercise control over WNP 4 and 5.
Whether the Participants utilized this mechanism 67 is an entirely dif-
ferent issue.
C. Independent Sources of Authority
1. The duty to provide for future power needs
Notwithstanding the Chemical Bank court's requirements of owner-
ship interest and sufficient control, the duty to provide future power
needs may be an independent source of authority to engage in power
projects. 68 Thirty years earlier in a situation nearly identical with
WPPSS, the Washington Supreme Court held, in State ex reL Public
Utility Dist. No. I of Pend Oreille County v. Schwab,69 that planners'
decisions about future load growth must be accepted in the absence of
a showing of arbitrary or capricious action.70 This requirement en-
63. Id. The Participants' committee considers construction budgets, contracts in-
volving more than $2 million, and proposed bond resolutions. IE
64. Id. Unless the Committee made a decision within 15 days on a proposal, the
proposal was automatically approved. Id.
65. As the project suffered from cost overruns and construction delays from its in-
ception, the Committee was accustomed to dealing with such matters and could easily
act within the fifteen day limit. See supra note 16.
66. Note, Chemical Bank v. WPPSS: A Case of Judicial Meltdown, 5 J. ENERGY L.
AND POL'Y 273, 290 (1984).
67. See id.
68. See supra notes 53-62 and accompanying text.
69. 40 Wash. 2d 814, 246 P.2d 1081 (1952). In Schwab, a public utility district
proposed to construct hydroelectric facilities. Id. at 816, 246 P.2d at 1083. Intervenors
sought to enjoin the district from issuing revenue bonds to finance the project. Id at
817, 246 P.2d at 1083-84. The proposed project would supply energy far beyond the
actual needs of the community. Id. at 826, 246 P.2d at 1088. Similarly, in the WPPSS
situation, even without the completion of WNP 4 and 5, the area serviced had sufficient
power.
70. Id. at 824, 246 P.2d at 1087, These errors are apparent only in hindsight. The
court in Chemical Bank rejects Schwab on the grounds that in Schwab the district re-
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sured that such predictions, of which immediate vindication is unavail-
able, arise from a reliable decisionmaking process."1 The Schwab
standard does not impose a requirement of completely accurate predic-
tion. Rather, the standard upholds inaccurate predictions as long as
they arise from reasoned judgment.72
The WPPSS situation lacks any showing of abuse of discretion on
the part of the planners.73 The planners' forecasts were advisable in
light of the circumstances.74 Clearly, the moral obligation to provide
adequate service at any cost provides authority for the project. 75
2. The implied power to pay
A second source of authority to engage in power projects lies in the
implied power to pay for services rendered to the municipality. The
statutory grant of authority to construct and operate electric utilities76
would be meaningless in the absence of the implied power to pay for
these facilities. 77 When the legislature fails to place limits on the mu-
tamined ownership in and management of the facility. Chemical Bank, 99 Wash. 2d at
790, 666 P.2d at 338. But see supra notes 56-57 (majority's reasoning regarding owner-
ship is flawed).
71. Schwab, 40 Wash. 2d at 824, 246 P.2d at 1087.
72. Id at 827, 246 P.2d at 1088. The court in Schwab noted that evidence showing
that the commissioners were incorrect in their estimate of future power needs fails to
indicate that in making that estimate they acted arbitrarily or capriciously. Id. at 830,
246 P.2d at 1090.
73. The inaccuracies on which the planners based their estimates is clear in hind-
sight. These estimates, however, were reasonable when made.
74. See supra note 46.
75. Olsen, supra note 9, at 21; Schwab, 40 Wash. 2d at 824, 246 P.2d at 1086-87.
76. See supra notes 50-52.
77. 2 E. MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 10.18a, 10.21
(rev. 3d ed. 1979) [hereinafter E. MCQUILLIN] (municipal power can be implied from
power clearly granted where the implied power is consistent with municipal purposes).
See also State ex rel. City of Memphis v. Hackman, 273 Mo. 670, 690, 202 S.W. 7, 11
(1918) ("There inheres in a grant of power to a municipal corporation all the necessary
incidentals to render the grant effectual."); Kirkwood Drug Co. v. City of Kirkwood,
387 S.W.2d 550 (1965); Willman v. City of Corsicana, 213 S.W.2d 155 (Tex. Civ. App.
1948).
In Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle v. City of Seattle, 57 Wash. 2d 446, 460, 357
P.2d 863, 872 (1960), the court held that with "the power to provide a sewer system
there is implied the power to pay for it." The court in Chemical Bank agrees with the
conclusion of Metro Seattle but distinguishes the case on the grounds that in Metro
Seattle the services were to be paid for as they were provided, while in Chemical Bank
the Agreement unconditionally obligated the Participants to pay. 99 Wash. 2d at 786,
666 P.2d at 336. In Metro Seattle, however, the contract required the city to pay for
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nicipality's power to form contracts, the municipal authorities must
determine the appropriate method of contracting.78 Unless the Partici-
pants abused their discretion by entering into unconditional obligations
for payment, the Participants possessed authority to enter into the
Agreements.79
Although the court in Chemical Bank applied a test of legal neces-
sity,80 the correct test for an exercise of discretion" by a municipality
is that of reasonableness.8" In support of its legal necessity test, the
Chemical Bank court relied on a taxation decision. 3 In earlier police
power decisions, however, the court stressed the reasonableness test.84
Thus, as the Participants possessed the authority to construct and op-
erate generating facilities,8 5 a court is powerless to inquire into the de-
tails of the Agreement adopted to carry that authority into execution86
sewage disposal solely out of anticipated revenues. 357 P.2d at 871. This is precisely
the situation in Chemical Bank. See supra notes 24, 26. Thus, Metro Seattle applies to
the WPPSS situation. See Chemical Bank, 99 Wash. 2d at 810, 666 P.2d at 348 (Utter,
J., dissenting) (municipal authority here must be interpreted broadly to provide the
flexibility necessary in furnishing electric power).
78. Frank, 572 P.2d at 1117. 2 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 77, at § 10.21 (when a
municipal corporation acts for the public good, it "is not to be shorn of its power by
mere implication"). The majority in Chemical Bank attempts to strip the Participants
of power by placing requirements of ownership and control on clear statutory language.
See supra note 53-56 and accompanying text.
79. Schwab, 40 Wash. 2d at 831, 246 P.2d at 1090 (where municipality exercises
discretion, a court can intervene only when it is shown that the commissioners acted
without deliberation or proceeded on improper motives).
80. Chemical Bank, 99 Wash. 2d at 792, 666 P.2d at 339.
81. See infra notes 94-97 for a discussion of discretionary and proprietary powers.
82. Frank, 572 P.2d at 1117. The court in Frank states that when the appropriate
method of contracting is left to the discretion of the municipality, the test of the con-
tract's validity is whether it is reasonable. Il
83. Chemical Bank, 99 Wash. 2d at 792, 666 P.2d at 339-40 (citing Hillis Homes,
Inc. v. Snohomish Cy., 97 Wash. 2d 804, 808, 650 P.2d 193, 197 (1982)).
84. See, Comment, A Cry for Reform in Construing Washington Municipal Corpora-
tion Statutes-Chemical Bank v. Washington Pub. Power Sys., 59 WAsH. L. REV. 653,
657 (1984); Scott Paper Co. v. City of Anacortes, 90 Wash. 2d 19, 29, 578 P.2d 1292,
1298 (1978) (the power to sell bonds carries with it the authority to enter into contracts
for the sale of municipal water, which provide the security for the bonds); Municipality
of Metropolitan Seattle v. City of Seattle, 57 Wash. 2d 446, 460, 357 P.2d 863, 872
(1960) (with authority to provide sewers there is implied authority to pay for the sys-
tem). But see State ex rel. Hill v. Port of Seattle, 104 Wash. 634, 641-42, 177 P. 671,
674, modified, 180 P. 137 (1919) (city's powers are limited by the terms of the act
creating it, and it has no power to meet demand in excess of its future requirements).
85. See supra notes 49-52.
86. 2 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 77, at § 10.33; Frank, 527 P.2d at 1115.
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in the absence of a showing that the Agreement was unreasonable.
D. The Governmental-Proprietary Distinction
Concluding that the power to purchase electricity fails to include a
purchase of project capability,87 the court in Chemical Bank narrowly
construed the powers granted to municipal entities.88 In so conclud-
ing, the Chemical Bank court failed to recognize that the scope of a
municipality's statutory authority turns on the nature of its act.
Courts recognize that municipal corporations have a dual charac-
ter. 9 The distinction lies between acts characterized as governmental
and those deemed private, or proprietary.9" Governmental powers are
those used to administer the affairs of the state and to promote the
general welfare.91 When exercising its governmental power, a munici-
pal corporation possesses the attributes of sovereignty. 92 Courts con-
strue grants of governmental power strictly.93
In exercising its private or proprietary powers, the municipal corpo-
ration acts for the private benefit of itself and of its inhabitants. 94 Act-
ing for its own benefit rather than for the benefit of the general public,
the municipal corporation acts as a legal individual.95 To afford the
municipality discretion in accomplishing the purpose of the statute in
question, 96  courts must interpret grants of proprietary power
87. See supra note 41.
88. 2 E. McQUILLIN, supra note 77, at § 10.18a.
89. See generally Comment, supra note 9, at 1103.
90. 2 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 77, at §§ 10.18a and 10.05.
91. In general, governmental powers include the construction and maintenance of
streets and the power to legislate as to public utilities. Id. at § 10.05.
92. Id. at § 10.22. City of Seattle v. Stirrat, 55 Wash. 560, 564, 104 P. 834, 835
(1909).
93. 2 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 77, at § 10.22.
94. 2 E. McQuILLIN, supra note 77, at § 10.05. See also City of Seattle v. Stirrat, 55
Wash. 560, 565, 104 P. 834, 835 (1909) (in its proprietary character, powers are to be
conferred "for the private advantage of the compact community").
95. 2 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 77, at § 10.03; City of Seattle v. Stirrat, 55 Wash.
560, 565, 104 P. 834, 835 (1909) (proprietary powers are exercised for the advantage of
the community "as a distinct legal personality of corporate individual"). Proprietary
powers include the power to enter into franchise agreements with utility companies and
the determination of the details of a bond issue. 2 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 77, at
§ 10.05.
96. Butler v. Karb, 96 Ohio St. 472, 482, 117 N.E. 953, 955-56 (1917) (successful
operation of city's utilities would be thwarted if the city was "hampered by detailed,
minute, and precise regulations").
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liberally. 7
Although at times this distinction between governmental and propri-
etary powers may seem unworkable,98 the general rule is that a munici-
pality's contracts for the supply of water and light represent the
exercise of its proprietary powers.99 Utility contracts are exercises of
proprietary power because the municipality benefits itself and itsinhabitants. "0
Courts must construe the statutory grants of proprietary power lib-
erally to achieve the "general object of their grant." 10' Since the gen-
eral object of the power to purchase electricity 1 2 is to provide
electrical service to residents, 10 3 a purchase of project capability serves
that broad purpose."° Thus, the Agreement is an act of discretion 0"
consistent with the purpose of the grant of proprietary power.106
97. 2 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 77, at § 10.22; Puget Sound Power & Light Com-
pany v. Public Utility District No. I of Chelan County, 17 Wash. App. 861, 864, 565
P,2d 1221, 1223 (1977) (in its proprietary power, the municipal entity is authorized to
do everything necessary to make the system efficient and beneficial).
98. Northwest Natural Gas Co. v. City of Portland, 300 Or. 291,298, 711 P.2d 119,
126 (Or. 1985) (governmental/proprietary distinction unhelpful in mass transit case).
99. 2 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 77, at § 34.126. See also Linne v. Bredes, 43
Wash. 540, 546, 86 P. 858, 860-61 (1906) (a municipal corporation furnishes water to its
inhabitants in the "capacity of a private corporation, and not in the exercise of... local
sovereignty"); Frank v. City of Cody, 572 P.2d 1106, 1110 (Wyo. 1977) (operation of an
electric utility is a proprietary function of the city).
100. Seattle v. Stirrat, 55 Wash. 560, 566, 104 P. 834, 836 (1909) (the power to lay
streets, sewers, and water pipes is proprietary because it was for the private advantage of
the city regardless of any benefit to the entire public); Puget Sound Power & Light
Company v. Public Utility District No. 1 of Chelan County, 17 Wash. App. 861, 863,
565 P.2d 1221, 1223 (1977) (municipal entity's decisions regarding the sale or produc-
tion of electricity is within its proprietary character); City of Joliet v. Alexander, 194 Ill.
457, 465, 62 N.E. 861, 864 (1902) (city, in enlarging water system, is engaged in propri-
etary power).
101. 0. POND, A TREATISE ON THE LAWS OF PUBLIC UTILITIES OPERATING IN
CITIES AND TOWNS § 11 (1913).
102. See supra note 40 for the text of this statute.
103. State ex rel. PUD No. 1 v. Wylie, 28 Wash. 2d 113, 150, 182 P.2d 706, 726
(1947).
104. Comment, supra note 9, at 1105.
105. See supra note 96. See Comment, supra note 9, at 1105.
106. Comment, supra note 9, at 1105. The reasonableness test, discussed supra
notes 80-86 and accompanying text, should be applied to any exercise of a municipal-
ity's proprietary power. Thus, a municipality's proprietary act will be upheld absent a
showing of abuse of discretion.
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IV. STATE DEBT LIMITATION
In the late nineteenth century, heavy municipal borrowing in order
to finance improvements such as canals and railroads caused financial
panic.1o7 To remedy this problem, states enacted statutes limiting the
amount of debt a municipality could incur.1"' These debt limitation
provisions soon proved too conservative, stifling even modest
growth. 0 9 Therefore, municipalities devised various methods to cir-
cumvent the debt restrictions. 10
A. The Special Fund Doctrine
One such method of circumventing debt restrictions is the special
fund.1 1 A special fund is a source of revenue that is fed by funds
related to the particular project being financed. 12 As long as it does
not obligate the general funds' 13 of the municipality, a special fund
107. Williams & Nehemkis, Municipal Improvements as Affected By Constitutional
Debt Limitations, 37 COLUM. L. REv. 177, 178 (1937); see also Heil, supra note 24.
108. For example, the Washington constitution provides:
No county, city, town, school district, or other municipal corporation shall for any
purpose become indebted in any manner to an amount exceeding one and one-half
per centum of the taxable property in such county, city, town, school district, or
other municipal corporation, without the assent of three-fifths of the voters therein
voting at an election to be held for that purpose...
WASH. CONsT. art. VIII, § 6. Similarly, the Idaho requirement is:
No county, city, board of education, or school district, or other subdivision of the
state, shall incur any indebtedness, or liability, in any manner, or for any purpose,
exceeding in that year, the income and revenue provided for it for such year, with-
out the assent of two thirds (2/3) of the qualified electors thereof voting at an elec-
tion to be held for that purpose...
IDAHO CONST. art. VIII, § 3. In Oregon, each city, in its charter, provides for its debt
limitation. See DeFazio v. Washington Public Power Supply System, 296 Or. 550, 570,
679 P.2d 1316, 1329 (1984).
109. Williams & Nehemkis, supra note 107, at 180-82. For example, a debt limita-
tion based on a percentage of the assessed value of property fails because there is no
relationship between that value and the municipality's need for public improvements or
its ability to finance such improvements. Id at 182.
110. See generally Williams & Nehemkis, supra note 107, at 182. Two such devices
are special assessments and sale-leaseback agreements. Id.
111. Id at 186-87.
112. Heil, supra note 24, at 81.
113. The "general funds" of a municipality include tax revenues. Williams &
Nehemkis, supra note 107, at 187. In Fjeldsted v. Ogden City, 83 Utah 278, 287, 28
P.2d 144, 151 (1933), the court recognized two limitations on the special fund excep-
tion. The special fund exemption is violated if. 1) the municipality must "feed" the
special fund from general revenues in addition to those arising solely from the improve-
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evades definition as debt, and consequently falls outside the debt limita-
tion provisions." 4 There are two types of special funds. A broad spe-
cial fund is one that is payable from sources merely related to the
project funded."1 5 A restricted or narrow special fund exists when an
obligation is payable solely from the revenues of the particular project
financed.116 Although some courts hold that a broad special fund cre-
ates debt, all courts agree that a narrow special fund does not.' 17 If the
obligation created does constitute debt, then the requirements of the
debt limitation provision must be fulfilled.118
In another case arising from the WPPSS situation, the Supreme
Court of Idaho held in Asson v. City of Burley" 9 that the Participants'
Agreements to pay WPPSS created debt.' 20 In Asson, five cities en-
tered into agreements with WPPSS to purchase project capability.' 2 '
The Agreement provided that if WPPSS either failed to secure financ-
ing or failed to complete the project, the Participants remained bound
to pay WPPSS for project capability.1 22 The Agreement also required
the Participants to maintain a special fund which would be generated
by revenues from the operation of their local utility systems. 123 The
Participants could use only that special fund to make their payments to
WPPSS.
The court in Asson included in the special fund exemption any self-
supporting undertaking that failed to obligate the city's general
fund."'24 With the plants incomplete, however, the cities were required
ment contemplated; or 2) the municipality suffers a loss because the special fund is
insufficient to pay the obligation incurred. Id See City of Joliet v. Alexander, 194 Ill.
457, 62 N.E. 861 (1902).
114. Heil, supra note 24, at 81.
115. Id. at 82.
116. City of Joliet v. Alexander, 194 Ill. 457, 465, 62 N.E. 861, 864 (1902) (court
applying a narrow special fund theory, held that the plan created debt because the spe-
cial fund was fed by existing property of the city).
117. See Heil, supra note 24, at 87-88.
118. In general, the statutes impose a requirement of voters' assent before a munici-
pality can incur debt. See supra note 108.
119. 105 Idaho 432, 670 P.2d 839 (1983).
120. Id. at 443, 670 P.2d at 850.
121. Id at 434, 670 P.2d at 841. These agreements are the same Participants'
Agreements considered by the court in Chemical Bank See supra notes 16-18.
122. Asson, 105 Idaho at 436, 670 P.2d at 843.
123. Id. at 437, 670 P.2d at 844; see supra note 16.
124. Asson, 105 Idaho at 438, 670 P.2d at 845. See also 15 E. MCQUILLIN, supra
note 77, at § 41.31; Goreham v. Des Moines Metropolitan Area Solid Waste Agency,
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to satisfy the WPPSS bonds without reliance on the revenue-producing
property that the Agreement contemplated. 125 The only way to satisfy
this obligation, the court claimed, was for each Participant to impose a
surcharge on all electric power users, including rate-paying resi-
dents. 126 The court in Asson asserted that such a surcharge would vio-
late the special fund exemption because it was, in effect, a tax. 127
Disagreeing with Asson, 128 the Oregon Supreme Court in DeFazio v.
Washington Public Power Supply System 129 considered whether the
raising of rates to pay off WPPSS violates the special fund doctrine. 130
After reviewing the history of debt limitation provisions, the court con-
cluded that the purpose of such provisions was "to forestall irresponsi-
bly imposed tax burdens." 131 As long as the special fund fails to
obligate tax revenues, it remains within the statutory exemption. 132
Both taxes and utility charges have a similar economic impact on the
individual by reducing his disposable income. 133 While everyone must
179 N.W.2d 449, 458 (Iowa 1970) (to constitute debt against the city, there must be an
obligation which the city must meet with its funds or property); Johnson v. Piedmont
Municipal Power Agency, 277 S.C. 345, 353, 287 S.E.2d 476, 480 (1982) (bonds issued
by joint operating agency payable solely from revenues derived by the JOA from the
sale of electricity to the municipalities do not create a general obligation).
125. Asson, 105 Idaho at 440, 670 P.2d at 847.
126. Id. The court's conclusion finds support in the Agreement which obligates the
Participants to maintain their own rates high enough to meet the costs of WPPSS. See
supra note 24.
127. Asson, 105 Idaho at 440, 670 P.2d at 847. The court in Asson states, "To the
extent this surcharge imposes an obligation on the rate payer unrelated to the quantity
of electricity used, it could constitute a tax." 105 Idaho at 440 n.17, 679 P.2d at 847
n.17. The court takes this argument to its logical and, by the court's own admission,
"fanciful" conclusion, stating that if there were only one ratepayer that ratepayer alone
would be forced to pay the entire obligation to WPPSS. Id
128. In Asson, Justice Bakes dissented. 105 Idaho at 443, 670 P.2d at 850.
129. 296 Or. 550, 679 P.2d 1316 (1984).
130. 296 Or. at 575, 679 P.2d at 1333. See also Barnes v. Lehi City, 74 Utah 321,
279 P. 878 (1929); Winston v. City of Spokane, 12 Wash. 524, 41 P. 888 (1895).
131. DeFazio, 296 Or. at 574, 679 P.2d at 1332; see Barnes v. Lehi City, 74 Utah at
340, 279 P. at 885.
132. Id See also Frank v. City of Cody, 572 P.2d 1106, 1114 (Wyo. 1977) (no debt
against the municipality is created when amounts due are payable from a special fund
not fed by taxes); State ex rel Mitchell v. City of Sikeston, 555 S.W.2d 281 (Mo. 1977)
(where municipalities entered dry-hole agreements with city for the supply of power,
obligating themselves to pay only from revenues of their elective system, municipalities
need not pay from tax monies).
133. DeFazio, 296 Or. at 574, 679 P.2d at 1332.
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pay taxes, charges for electricity are escapable."' If the price of elec-
tricity becomes too high, consumers are free to switch to alternative
sources.13 Thus, the inevitable rate increases due to the failure of
WPPSS remain within the special fund doctrine because they do not
implicate tax revenues.136
B. Was the Construction of WNP 4 and 5 an Ordinary and
Necessary Expense?
Even if the Participants' obligations to WPPSS do constitute an in-
debtedness, the obligations may be exempt from the debt limitation re-
quirement as ordinary and necessary expenses. Although most states
have such an exemption,137 few are phrased as explicitly as that in the
Idaho constitution.' An expense is "ordinary" if, in the ordinary
course of the transaction of municipal business, or in the maintenance
of municipal projects, the expense becomes necessary. 13 9 Generally,
"ordinary" means "often recurring" and "necessary" means "indispen-
134. Id. Barnes v. Leehi City, 74 Utah at 341, 279 P. at 885.
135. DeFazio, 296 Or. at 574, 679 P.2d at 1333.
136. In Board of Comm'rs. of Louisiana Mun. Power Conm'n. v. All Taxpayers,
Property Owners, and Citizens, 360 So. 2d 863, 868 (La. 1978), the court held that a
dry-hole agreement for the provision of electricity was payable only from the revenues
of the municipalities' utilities. The obligation failed to implicate the cities' general
funds, even though customers may be subject to increased charges if the project fails.
Id. Moreover, while possible loss to the cities' general funds of net utility revenues may
affect solvency, it fails to "convert a charge against utility revenues to a charge against
other income and revenues." Id. See also Frank v. City of Cody, 572 P.2d 1106, 1114
(Wyo. 1977) (municipality fails to create debt where obligations are payable from a
special fund created from service charges only collected from users).
137. Morrow v. Durham, 210 N.C. 564, 187 S.E. 752, 753 (1936) (plan for re-
funding of county bonds to create lower interest rate held to be a necessary expense);
Love v. King County, 181 Wash. 462, 465, 44 P.2d 175, 177 (1935) (debt limitation
provisions do not include ordinary and necessary expenses); Sainer v. Thurston County,
181 Wash. 552, 556-57, 44 P.2d 179, 180 (1935) (indebtedness created for indigent relief
falls outside debt limitation provision); Davis v. Lenoir County, 178 N.C. 668, 101 S.E.
260 (recognizing the exemption for public roads); Bramham v. City of Durham, 171
N.C. 196, 199, 88 S.E. 347, 348 (1916) (recognizing the exemption for building and
repair of streets and sidewalks); Martin v. City of Raleigh, 208 N.C. 369, 375, 180 S.E.
786, 790-91 (1935) (recognizing the exemption for tax to provide for medical care of the
indigent).
138. See Moore, infra note 139.
139. Dexter Horton Trust and Savings Bank v. Clearwater County, 235 F. 743, 752
(D. Idaho 1916); Moore, Constitutional Debt Limitations on Local Government in
Idaho-Article 8, section 3, Idaho Constitution, 17 IDAHo L. REv. 55, 79 (1980). See
Hanson v. City of Idaho Falls, 92 Idaho 512, 514, 446 P.2d 634, 636 (1968) (weekly or
monthly compensation of police officers is an ordinary and necessary expense). The
1988]
Washington University Open Scholarship
344 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 34:325
sable."1 Ordinary and necessary expenses do, however, include infre-
quent necessities. 141 In holding that an expenditure for the repair or
improvement of city property is an ordinary and necessary expense, the
court in Hickey v. City of Nampa 1 4 2 recognized that even infrequent
expenditures may be ordinary and necessary expenses.
143
The projects authorized by the Participants' Agreements fall within
the ambit of these definitions. In the ordinary course of providing for
the electric supply of their inhabitants, the Participants purchased
shares of future power supply from WPPSS. This appears to be the
type of "infrequent necessity" falling squarely within the exemption.
Moreover, the project clearly was necessary, or indispensable, as the
planners of WPPSS foresaw power shortages without the project.' 44
The majority in Asson, however, held that the Participants' indebted-
ness was outside the "ordinary and necessary expenses" provision of
the Idaho constitution.1 4 5 The court concluded that although repair is
an ordinary and necessary expense, the construction or the purchase of
new facilities falls outside the exemption. 14 6 Acknowledging that the
decisions to build WNP 4 and 5 may have been necessary in light of the
circumstances,14 7 the court refused to find that the construction of
WNP 4 and 5 was an ordinary expense because of its colossal size and
risk.
148
In reaching its conclusion, the majority in Asson glossed over City of
Pocatello v. Peterson,149 placing it within the "repair or maintenance"
line of cases. 5 ° In Peterson, the court held that a contract for the ex-
periodic compensation in Hanson is clearly analogous to the periodic payments by the
Participants to WPPSS.
140. City of Pocatello v. Peterson, 93 Idaho 774, 778, 473 P.2d 644, 648 (1970).
141. Id. at 778, 473 P.2d at 648.
142. 22 Idaho 41, 124 P. 280 (1912).
143. Id at 45-46, 124 P. at 281.
144. See supra note 46.
145. Asson, 105 Idaho at 443, 670 P.2d at 850.
146. Id See also Dunbar v. Board of Comm'rs of Canyon County, 5 Idaho 407, 49
P. 409, 411 (1897) (the payment of bounties for rabbit scalps fails to be an ordinary and
necessary expense of a county).
147. Asson, 105 Idaho at 442-43, 670 P.2d at 849-50.
148. Id
149. 93 Idaho, 774, 473 P.2d 644 (1970).
150. Asson, 105 Idaho at 442, 670 P.2d at 849. After reviewing the facts of Peterson,
the court in Asson notes that "the [Peterson] court's emphasis on the obsolescence and
9
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pansion of an airport was an ordinary and necessary expense.151 The
court based its decision on the presence of several factors also present
in the WPPSS situation. First, the city possessed statutory authority to
build the project,152 as did each Participant in WPPSS. 15 3 Second, the
city of Pocatello operated an airport for more than twenty years before
deciding to expand and improve it. 54 Similarly, the perceived inade-
quacies of WPPSS led to efforts to improve and expand WPPSS .by
constructing WNP 4 and 5 in 1974.155 Third, the existing airport in
Peterson was inadequate to serve the perceived needs of the city. 156
Moreover, the court in Peterson stressed that the improvement of the
airport was essential for the growth and development of the entire re-
gion. 157 Likewise, without the electricity that WNP 4 and 5 would
produce, the planners predicted great shortages for areas of five states,
with a concomitant stultifying effect on regional growth, 5 The deci-
sion by WPPSS to build WNP 4 and 5 was made to redress the per-
ceived future electrical shortages of the region. Based on a
consideration of the Peterson factors, the construction of WNP 4 and 5
is an ordinary and necessary expense.
C. Should A Broad or Narrow Special Fund Doctrine Be Applied?
In applying the special fund doctrine, courts distinguish between
narrow and broad special funds.'5 9 The distinction lies in the extent to
which the special fund is self-supporting. Under a broad special fund,
no debt arises as long as the source of repaying relates to the project
funded and no tax revenues are involved."6 A narrow special fund
unsafe conditions of the... facility place it within the 'repair or maintenance' line of
case authority." Id.
151. Peterson, 93 Idaho at 779, 473 P.2d at 649.
152. Id. at 777, 473 P.2d at 647.
153. See supra notes 49-52.
154. Peterson, 93 Idaho at 778, 473 P.2d at 648.
155. See supra note 46 and text accompanying notes 1-11.
156. Id at 649; see also Hickey, 22 Idaho at 43-44, 124 P. at 280-81.
157. Peterson, 93 Idaho at 779, 473 P.2d at 649.
158. See Lloyd Corporation v. Bannock County, 53 Idaho 478, 481, 25 P.2d 217,
220 (1933) (emergency warrants issued in payment of ordinary and necessary county
expenses authorized by court). In Lloyd, unforeseen circumstances arose, making nec-
essary the expenditure of more money to meet certain ordinary and necessary expenses.
Id This was the situation in WPPSS.
159. Seesupra notes 115-17.
160. See supra notes 116-18; see also Heil, supra note 24, at 82.
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allows payments to be made only from the proceeds of the particular
project. 1 6 1
In City of Joliet v. Alexander162 the Illinois Supreme Court recog-
nized the narrow special fund doctrine. In Joliet, the city passed an
ordinance providing for the enlargement of the water system. 163 The
city proposed the issuance of certificates to finance the enlargement. 164
Upon completion of the project, all revenues from the water system
were to go into a special fund which alone was liable for the certifi-
cates.1 65 The court concluded that this special fund was a debt because
it provided for repayment of the certificates from property already
owned by the city. 166 The court in Joliet established the theory that
although "a pledge of the revenue created by or allocable to the part
itself" fails to create debt, "a pledge of all the revenues of the existing
utility to pay for only a part of that utility does create debt."' 167
Thus, when an addition or enlargement is made on a pre-existing
facility, a narrow special fund exists if it is possible to segregate the
earnings of the enlargement from the revenues of the pre-existing facil-
ity. WNP 4 and 5 can be seen as an extension of WPPSS itself. To fall
within the narrow special fund doctrine, the revenues from WNP 4 and
5 must be separable from those of the rest of WPPSS. 168
The proponents of the narrow special fund agree that constitutional
debt limitations refer to debts payable from taxation. They maintain,
however, that an obligation which deprives the general municipal
funds of proprietary revenue (a broad special fund) is a burden on the
taxpayer and is thus a debt. 169 The answer to this argument is that
constitutional debt limitations apply only to obligations for the pay-
ment of which a levy of taxes can be required.17 The converse is also
161. Heil, supra note 24, at 98; Williams & Nehemkis, supra note 107, at 195; Fjeld-
sted v. Ogden City, 83 Utah 278, 292-94, 28 P.2d 144, 150-51 (1933).
162. 62 N.E. 861 (IIl. 1902).
163. Id at 862.
164. Id
165. Id.
166. Id at 864.
167. Williams & Nehemkis, supra note 107, at 194.
168. If the revenues are separable, then the project evades definition of debt. Even if
the revenues are not separable, WNP 4 and 5 may still fall within the broad special fund
doctrine.
169. Williams & Nehemkis, supra note 107, at 185. A narrow special fund fails to
do this and is thus not debt.
170. Id
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true: an obligation for the payment of which taxation cannot be re-
quired is not debt. 17 1 Thus, a broad special fund obligation merely
deprives the taxpayer of the use of proprietary revenue to satisfy debts
that are properly chargeable to taxation. 172 Such debts are those for
municipal government services, which clearly should not be paid by
municipal utility rates. 
173
A second argument against the narrow special fund doctrine is that
it is impracticable to segregate earnings to a part of a utility system. 174
A restricted special fund would preclude additions to existing facilities
because of the difficulty in determining what part of the revenues of the
expanded utility should be applied to the bonds issued for the improve-
ment. 17 5 One commentator, however, claims that segregation of reve-
nues is practical.
176
The foregoing analysis of the narrow special fund indicates its un-
popularity. This general disfavor leads most courts to apply the broad
special fund doctrine. 177 Consequently, more projects evade the debt
limitation provisions than if the narrow special fund were generally
accepted.
V. ANALYSIS
The court's decision in Chemical Bank placed the burden of default
on the individual investors. A different interpretation of the statutes at
issue in Chemical Bank leads to the more equitable result of placing the
burden on the cities. First, although clear statutory authority to
purchase electricity 17 ' and to build and operate generating facilities
179
existed, such authority failed to mandate the supply of electricity by
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. But see Note, Constitutional Restrictions Upon Municipal Indebtedness,
1966 UTAH L. REv. 462, 476.
174. Williams & Nehemkis, supra note 107, at 196; see supra note 167 and accom-
panying text.
175. Note, supra note 173, at 476-77; Williams & Nehemkis, supra note 107, at 196.
176. Note, supra note 173, at 477.
177. Williams & Nehemkis, supra note 107, at 195. These commentators state,
"The fact that only one reported decision [Bell v. City of Fayette, 325 Mo. 75, 28
S.W.2d 356 (1930)] has been found in which a restricted special fund has been sustained
inspires suspicion of the merit of the doctrine." Id.
178. See supra note 40.
179. See supra notes 49-52.
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the Participants. 8 ' The fulfillment of these statutes was entirely
within the discretion of the Participants.181 When the Participants ac-
ted on this discretionary authority, they did so within their proprietary
power.182 Therefore, -the Participants were free to choose any means
necessary to fulfill the statutes granting them authority.183 The only
limit imposed was that of the test of reasonableness.184 Within this
scope of authority, the Participants reasonably185 chose to supply elec-
tricity by purchasing project capability instead of electricity itself. As
the Participants possessed authority to enter into the Agreements, they
must be held to the Agreements and the consequent liability.
Second, the municipality's ability to purchase project capability is
essential to municipal growth. The court in Chemical Bank frustrates
that goal by requiring express legislative or judicial proof of authority
before allowing a municipality to act. 186 This requirement is contrary
to the general rule that a municipality can act in the absence of explicit
authority.187 With the application of the Chemical Bank rule, munici-
palities would be hesitant to issue bonds and spur development.18
Moreover, municipalities would be less likely to implement innovative
solutions to their energy needs.' 89
The court in Chemical Bank concluded that the Participants' pay-
ment obligations to WPPSS constituted debt.19° Finding that the Par-
ticipants violated the debt limitation provisions, the court held that the
Participants lacked the authority to enter into the Agreement. 191 Ac-
cordingly, the court placed the burden of default on the investors. For
several reasons, however, the Participants' obligations to WPPSS failed
to constitute debt.
180. See Note, supra note 66, at 286.
181. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
182. See Note, supra note 66, at 286.
183. State ex rel. City of Memphis v. Hackman, 202 S.W. 7, 11 (Mo. 1918) ("There
inheres in a grant of [proprietary] power to a municipal corporation all the necessary
incidentals to render the grant effectual.").
184. See supra note 82.
185. See supra note 46.
186. The court interprets statutes narrowly.
187. Frank v. City of Cody, 572 P.2d 1106, 1115 (Wyo. 1977) (municipality can act
even though the legislature has not provided "every little detail").
188. See Comment, supra note 84, at 667.
189. Id
190. See supra note 118.
191. See supra note 126.
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First, the construction of WNP 4 and 5 fell within the ordinary and
necessary expenses exception to the debt limitation provisions. Based
on the planners' belief of future power inadequacies, the expense was
clearly necessary.1 92 Moreover, as improvements essential for the
growth and development of the region, WNP 4 and 5 were ordinary
expenses. 1
93
The majority in Asson, however, refused to recognize the construc-
tion of WNP 4 and 5 as an ordinary expense because of its great size
and risk.1 94 Application of this rationale would place all but the most
insignificant municipal undertakings beyond the parameters of the or-
dinary and necessary exemption. Most major municipal projects
within the scope of ordinary municipal business are large. As the legis-
lature created the ordinary and necessary exemption specifically for
such projects, the court's interpretation in Asson would frustrate the
purpose of the exemption.
Second, by providing that payments be made to WPPSS solely from
the revenues generated by WNP 4 and 5, the Agreement created a spe-
cial fund. 95 The WPPSS obligations may'96 eventually force the Par-
ticipants to raise their utility rates. Since raising rates does not always
implicate tax revenues, 97 it does not violate the purpose of the debt
limitation provisions, which is to avoid irresponsibly imposed tax
burdens.' 98
Whether the special fund here is a debt also depends on the type of
special fund applied. A narrow special fund is inappropriate because it
would exclude the special fund revenues derived from raised utility
rates.' 99 As such, the narrow special fund places the risk of noncom-
pletion on the investors. The increased risk results in higher interest
rates on the bonds and slower municipal growth.2" Moreover, the
narrow special fund is a weak doctrine that lacks precedential
192. See supra note 147.
193. See supra note 24.
194. See supra note 148.
195. See supra note 24.
196. The possibility still exists that other cities may "buy out" the Participants'
share and pay off WPPSS. Olsen, supra note 9, at 25.
197. See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 131-322 and accompanying text.
199. Id. But see supra notes 16-73 and accompanying text.
200. Heil, supra note 24, at 102.
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support.
20 1
Although a broad special fund would necessitate rate increases, it
places the risk of default where it should be-on the cities. After all,
the cities entered the Agreements, not the bondholders. Moreover, the
cities were in a better position to assess the risk of noncompletion than
were the individual investors.
Clearly, the correct legal result would place the burden of default on
the municipalities and their ratepaying citizens. Social policy, how-
ever, dictates a different result. Both the ratepayers and the investors
should be absolved from the burden of WPPSS. Although the ratepay-
ers elected the local officials responsible for entering into the Agree-
ments,20 2 the ratepayers/voters were ordinary citizens who knew less
about nuclear power economics than did the WPPSS planners.203 Sim-
ilarly, the investors were innocent citizens induced into their purchases
by the promise of a sound investment. 2°
One noted authority suggested that the taxpayers of the United
States should bear the burden of the WPPSS default.20 5  A federal
agency (The Bonneville Power Administration) was instrumental in
selling WPPSS to the unwitting consumers of the Northwest. 6
Therefore, the federal government should take responsibility by appro-
priating from the general tax revenues enough money to pay off the
burden of the WPPSS default. 0 7
201. See supra notes 169-77 and accompanying text.
202. Olsen, supra note 9, at 23. Olsen believes that the ratepayers should be held
responsible for failing to exercise political control over these local officials at the ballot
box. See Note, Municipal Antifraud Liability Under the Federal Securities Laws Upon
Issuance of Tax-Exempt Industrial Development Bonds;, 24 WASH. U.J. URB. & CON-
TEMP. L. 193, 211 (1983).
203. The planners of WPPSS did not know how to plan the economics of nuclear
power plants. Olsen, supra note 9, at 20. Therefore, it would be unreasonable to expect
the ratepayers to exercise effective political control over the planners when the ratepay-
ers, as ordinary citizens, were not conversant with the planning of nuclear plants. It
would be inequitable to place the burden on the ratepayers who knew even less about
what they were getting into than did the planners of WPPSS who convinced them to
enter the Agreements. Interview with John N. Drobak, Professor of Law, Washington
University School of Law in St. Louis, Missouri (March 19, 1987).
204. Ia Part of the blame for the investors' decisions to purchase the WPPSS
bonds lies on the law firms who recommended WPPSS as a sound investment. Id.
205. Id
206. See generally Comment, supra note 69.
207. Interview, supra note 203. Allocating the loss to the federal government would
be beneficial. First, the huge burden of WPPSS would be borne by all the citizens of the
United States instead of by a few in the Northwest. Second, other terminated nuclear
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol34/iss1/12
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VI. CONCLUSION
The WPPSS situation presents the dilemma of who should bear the
burden of default. While the correct legal result would place the bur-
den on the municipalities, social policy dictates a compelling counter-
argument. What is clear from the litigation arising from the WPPSS
fiasco is that courts must interpret statutes to place the burden of any
similar situation on all federal taxpayers.
Ivan P. Jecklin*
projects such as Shoreham in Long Island, New York, would be paid off. This would
alleviate great financial drains on the regions in which these stagnant nuclear projects
exist. Finally, the federal government is in large part responsible for the failure to fol-
low through on its sales pitch of nuclear power to the American consumer. Federal
agencies are responsible for inducing consumer acceptance of nuclear power in specific
instances, such as WPPSS. See supra note 206 and accompanying text. When a project
fails, the federal government should not shirk its duty to pay off the monster it created.
Interview, supra note 203.
* J.D., Washington University, 1988.
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